FRESH GROUND THEOLOGY

Could Demons Turn You Into an Animal? Augustine’s Theory of Supernatural Shapeshifting

Fresh Ground Theology logo

Could a demon turn you into an animal? Augustine of Hippo actually considered the question, and his answer is considerably stranger than a simple yes or no. He rejected the idea that a demon could take a human body and genuinely remake it into a wolf, horse, bird, or other creature. But he did not conclude that every story of supernatural shapeshifting was necessarily invented.

Hear our conversation on the Church Fathers and monsters.

Instead, Augustine tried to explain how people might genuinely experience something that looked and felt like transformation without their human nature actually changing. His discussion appears in The City of God XVIII.17–18, where he moves from old stories about Circe and werewolves into a surprisingly detailed theory of demonic deception, perception, dreams, and what he calls the phantasticum. The werewolf stories provide the evidence under discussion, but Augustine’s real question is broader: what kind of power can demons actually exercise over the material world and human perception?

That question also places Augustine within a larger early Christian tradition. Athanasius describes demons taking the appearances of animals, women, giants, and soldiers in the Life of Antony. Lactantius likewise describes demons as beings whose power operates through deception, false appearances, magic, divination, and the manipulation of human fear. Read together, these writers do not give us a systematic early Christian theory of shapeshifting, but they do give us a fairly consistent way of thinking about supernatural appearances.

Augustine Starts With the Werewolf Stories

Augustine does not invent the shapeshifting question. In City of God XVIII.17, he summarizes stories reported by the Roman scholar Varro about Circe transforming the companions of Ulysses and about Arcadians who supposedly crossed a pool, became wolves, lived as animals for nine years, and then returned to human form. He even names Demænetus, whom Varro said became a wolf after participating in a human sacrifice and later returned to human form and became an Olympic boxer.

Augustine could simply have dismissed all of this as pagan nonsense. He clearly regarded some of the stories as incredible, and he was perfectly willing to say that reports of supernatural events could be false. Yet he also knew that similar stories continued to circulate in his own time, including reports from people whom he did not consider obvious liars. That left him with a more interesting problem than whether ancient Greeks told stories about werewolves: if some extraordinary experiences really did occur, what exactly had happened?

This distinction is crucial for understanding him. Augustine is not arguing that Varro proved the existence of literal werewolves. He is asking whether a real supernatural event could stand behind a mistaken interpretation of that event. The experience may be real while the explanation attached to it is wrong, a distinction Augustine uses repeatedly when discussing pagan religion and demonic activity.

What Demons Cannot Do

Augustine begins his explanation by establishing a boundary. Demons are creatures, not creators, and therefore they do not possess God’s ability to create or remake natures at will. He says that demons, even if such supernatural events occur, “do not create real substances,” but instead manipulate appearances so that created things seem to be something they are not.

That immediately rules out one version of shapeshifting. Augustine does not believe that a demon can take the substance of a human body and convert it into the substance of a wolf while preserving the person’s human identity underneath. A human being might appear to become an animal, might believe himself to have become an animal, and might even be perceived by other people as an animal, but Augustine refuses to grant demons the creative power necessary for genuine metamorphosis.

This was not a trivial distinction in Augustine’s theology. Creation belongs to God, and created natures have an integrity that demons cannot simply rewrite. Later Christian discussions of werewolves repeatedly drew upon this Augustinian restriction, and Jean-Claude Schmitt’s study of medieval metamorphosis notes that Augustine’s treatment became foundational for the Christian interpretation of supposed transformations as demonic illusion rather than literal passage from one created nature into another.

Yet “illusion” can give the wrong impression if we hear it as meaning nothing happened. Augustine’s argument is more complicated. He allows demons real agency, real knowledge, real effects upon human beings, and apparently some ability to manipulate physical circumstances. What he denies is the particular power claimed for them: the ability actually to create a wolf out of a man.

Augustine’s Phantasticum

Here Augustine introduces the strangest part of his explanation. A human being possesses what he calls the phantasticum, the image-forming capacity by which the mind experiences forms in thought and especially in dreams. You can lie motionless in bed while, from your own point of view, you are walking through a city, falling through the air, running from something, or inhabiting a body very different from the one actually lying under the blankets.

Augustine proposes that demons may be able to exploit precisely this feature of human perception. The person’s physical senses can be suppressed into something like an unusually deep sleep while the phantasticum assumes another appearance. Somehow, and Augustine openly admits that he does not know how, this image can then be presented to other people’s senses almost as though it possessed a body of its own.

The resulting event would be considerably more elaborate than an ordinary hallucination. The victim could experience himself as an animal while another person might apparently see that animal. Meanwhile, the victim’s real human body would remain somewhere else, alive but insensible. Augustine even suggests that if the apparent animal seems to carry a real physical burden, the demon itself may carry the burden while presenting the false animal-form to observers, combining genuine physical effects with a deceptive appearance.

That is Augustine’s basic model of supernatural shapeshifting. The human body does not become an animal. The human mind does not become an animal mind either. Instead, demonic activity separates what is perceived from what is materially present, producing an experience convincing enough that the transformed person and outside observers may both believe that an actual metamorphosis has occurred.

The Man Who Thought He Became a Horse

Augustine gives an example that shows how seriously he was considering this mechanism. A man named Praestantius told him that his father had eaten something in a piece of cheese and then fallen into an unnaturally profound sleep. When the man eventually woke, he reported that he had spent the interval as a pack animal carrying provisions with other beasts for soldiers travelling toward Raetia.

The striking part of the story is that Augustine says the reported transportation of supplies corresponded with events that had actually occurred. He therefore does not explain the story merely by saying the father dreamed that he was a horse. His suggestion is that the man’s experience occurred through the phantasticum while demonic agency supplied whatever external actions were necessary to make the episode correspond with events in the waking world.

Augustine immediately gives another example in which one man dreamed of explaining Platonic philosophy while another man, who was awake, apparently saw him arrive and give the explanation. When confronted later, the philosopher denied physically going anywhere and said that he had dreamed the conversation. Augustine therefore had a category for an experience in which something occurring within one person’s dream appeared externally to somebody else.

Whether we accept Augustine’s explanation is a separate question from accurately describing it. He was trying to preserve several pieces of evidence simultaneously: credible people could report extraordinary experiences, demons possessed deceptive powers, human bodies could not actually be transformed into another created nature, and the supernatural world remained completely dependent upon God’s permission. His theory of the phantasticum was his attempt to explain all four without throwing away any one of them.

Athanasius: Demons That Look Like Animals

Several decades before Augustine wrote The City of God, Athanasius described something similar from the opposite direction. In the Life of Antony, demons do not make Antony think he has become an animal. Instead, the demons themselves repeatedly appear under animal and human forms in order to terrify him.

One of the most memorable scenes describes Antony’s dwelling suddenly filled with appearances of lions, bears, leopards, bulls, serpents, scorpions, and wolves. Athanasius emphasizes that each behaves according to the creature it resembles: the lion roars, the bull threatens with its horns, the serpent writhes, and the wolf rushes forward. Antony’s answer is almost contemptuous, because the multiplication of frightening forms demonstrates weakness rather than strength.

Later Athanasius generalizes the phenomenon. Demons approach by “changing their shapes, taking the forms of women, wild beasts, creeping things, gigantic bodies, and troops of soldiers.” Their objective is not genuine biological transformation but fear, distraction, deception, and ultimately the interruption of Antony’s pursuit of God.

David Brakke has pointed out how prominent these dramatic forms are in Athanasius’s portrayal of Antony, where the ascetic confronts demons appearing as beasts, giants, and other frightening figures. Yet the literary point is not to make Antony into an expert cataloguer of monsters. Athanasius presents Antony as the holy man who refuses to let spectacular appearances dictate reality, because the demons’ terrifying displays remain subordinate to Christ.

That framework fits well with Augustine’s later argument. Both writers take demonic manifestation seriously while refusing to equate appearance with nature. A demon may look like a lion without becoming a lion, just as a human being may apparently look like a wolf without having his humanity chemically or substantially reconstructed.

For a broader discussion of how early Christians connected physical practices with resistance to demons, see Fresh Ground Theology’s Holy Oil in the Early Church: Healing, Exorcism, and the Fight Against Demons. The same basic theological hierarchy appears there: demons possess genuine powers of harassment and deception, but they never become independent rivals to God.

Lactantius and the Power of Deception

Lactantius provides another piece of the early Christian background. In Divine Institutes II.15, he connects demons with the fallen angels and their offspring and describes them as spirits devoted to the destruction and deception of human beings. More directly relevant here, he says that magical practices work through these spirits, who “deceive the sight of men with deceptive illusions.”

The language is remarkably close to the conceptual framework later made more precise by Augustine. Demonic power operates by causing people not to see what is really present and to perceive what is not actually there. Lactantius does not develop anything resembling Augustine’s detailed theory of the phantasticum, but he supplies the basic demonological category within which such a theory makes sense.

Lactantius then broadens the problem from strange apparitions to religious deception. Astrology, necromancy, magic, oracles, and divination appear impressive because demons lend them apparent credibility while withholding or distorting the truth. Their supernatural activity is therefore ordered toward deception: power is used to produce false belief.

His treatment of the origin of demons also reflects the Watchers tradition that circulated widely among early Christians. Fresh Ground Theology has examined that tradition in more detail in Who Were the Watchers in Genesis 6? Nephilim, Hermon, and the Second Fall. Lactantius’s particular reconstruction should not simply be equated with everything Augustine or Athanasius believed, but all three writers assume that rebellious spiritual beings possess real yet strictly creaturely powers.

What These Writers Actually Agree On

It would be too neat to turn Augustine, Athanasius, and Lactantius into a single patristic system. Athanasius is writing an ascetic biography, Lactantius is constructing an apologetic account of pagan religion and demons, and Augustine is solving a particular philosophical and theological problem raised by stories of metamorphosis. They also do not explain every mechanism in the same terms.

Yet several common convictions emerge. Demons are real created beings rather than rival gods. They can deceive human perception and apparently assume forms that do not correspond to their actual nature. They can produce experiences dramatic enough to be mistaken for transformations, apparitions, divine revelations, or magical powers, while their ability remains limited by the sovereignty of God.

Their demonology therefore avoids two easy conclusions. The first would say that because a supposed supernatural event involves deception, nothing supernatural happened. The second would say that because something supernatural happened, the witnesses correctly understood what they experienced. Augustine especially refuses that second move: an extraordinary experience may itself be one of the instruments by which a false explanation is created.

That distinction also appears in the biblical framework Fresh Ground Theology has used when discussing Can Demons Oppress Christians? What the Bible Actually Shows. Scripture and the early Christian writers both treat spiritual conflict as real without encouraging Christians to interpret every unusual experience as proof of whatever supernatural explanation first presents itself.

So, Could a Demon Turn You Into an Animal?

Augustine’s answer is no, if by “turn you into an animal” we mean actually transform your human body and nature into those of another creature. He considered that kind of metamorphosis beyond demonic power because demons cannot create natures. A wolf is a wolf, a human being is a human being, and demons cannot simply erase the distinction established in creation.

But Augustine’s answer becomes a qualified yes if the question is whether demons could make a person experience something remarkably like transformation. He thought they might overpower the senses, manipulate the phantasticum, present animal forms to observers, and coordinate real physical effects with false appearances. In that scenario nobody has actually become a wolf or horse, yet the event could be convincing enough to generate precisely the sort of shapeshifting story Augustine inherited from Varro.

Athanasius helps complete the picture from the other direction. Demons themselves could appear as animals, monsters, gigantic figures, soldiers, or human beings without actually possessing those natures. Lactantius supplies the governing purpose behind such displays: deception, fear, idolatry, and the distortion of human perception.

So Augustine did not believe in literal demonic shapeshifting. He believed in something more complicated: supernatural deception capable of producing experiences so concrete that a witness could sincerely report a transformation that never occurred at the level of nature. Whether every story Augustine heard was true, he did not claim to know. But if some of them were true, City of God XVIII.18 tells us how he thought the trick might work.

Leave a Reply